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PROGRESS OF STUDIES
Europe
11. The studies are divided into four main groups.
Wa
The first, a single
study No. 1 relates to Europe. Its purpose was to examine whether a redeployment to the United Kingdom of one-third of the combat formations in Germany would of itself lead to force reductions, given that the forces redeployed (or their equivalents) remained earmarked for assignment to NATO. The conclusion was that there would be no increase in forces available for operations overseas, but that, because it would improve flexibility, some saving of forces in the United Kingdom might be practicable, The study was unable to estimate what disbandments were possible. It would not permit any long-term reduction in RAF combat units. Broadly, cach battalion disbanded would save £1 million annually in budgetary terms. The capital costs of reproviding in the United Kingdom accommodation and training facilities would be about £40 million: against this there would be annual budgetary savings of about £6 million net, reducing to 85 million net after 1970-71, both figures including some savings from disbandment. redeployment would yield a saving of about £12 million annually in foreign exchange.
The
12. In combination with redeployment from other theatres, the redeployment from Germany considered in Study No. 1 may offer the possibility of further disbandments and hence further budgetary savings. These cannot as yet be assessed but, given that our allies are likely to accept our proposals only if the forces withdrawm remain available to NATO (and this is the assumption that Ministerial instructions imply), they cannot now make a large contribution (as was originally envisaged) to the £200-300 million.
13. Any large scale withdrawal without the acquiescence of our allies would risk disrupting NATO and causing grave damage to our European policies including our approach to the EEC. However, the current tripartite discussions with the Americans and the Germans on offset and the NATO studies of strategy and force levels in Europe will, we hope, together with negotiations in WEU, enable us to make reductions in our forces in Europe of the order of those contemplated in Study No. 1 with the agreement of our allies.
14.
We are likely to be discussing reductions in May or June,
and this will very probably become public knowledge. In that context alone it will be advisable to make a public statement soon on force reductions elsewhere in the world. Looking further ahead the possibility of making larger reductions in Europe, whether or hot on the basis of East-West agreement, takes us beyond the immediate scope of this paper.
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