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There are a number of good arguments to justify this re-appraisal
of our role in the Far East, and we should use then as seemed nost appropriate during our consultations. We could begin by explaining
openly that the re-appraisal was forced on us by the need to strengthen
our economy. We did not conceal that such a strengthening would be
partly for our own sake but our allies would recognise that only by so
doing could we continue to make our contribution to general stability
in the world. Our economic position demanded a reduction in planned
public expenditure and in expenditure overseas, of which defonce forms a specially large part. Our present military position in the Far East, which had been originally justified by our position in India and as a major colonial power, was now out of scale with our political and commercial interests in the area, substantial though these still were.. In addition, we might argue that while it was true that we were at present still welcome in the Far East, in a few years' time, particularly after the end of the Vietnam war (when the United States themselves no longer wished to stay on the mainland of Asia), this sentiment would almost certainly have changed; and that it would be only sensible politically, as well as in accordance with our economic interests, to decide now on a long-term withdrawal over the horizon. To carry out this decision in such a way as to mitigate the likelihood of instability required long-term planning in close consultation with the other countries concerned; long-term planning is essential also for our military purposes.
5. In discussion with the United States, we might concentrate particularly on their own plens after the end of the Vietnam war. In
our consultations with Australia and New Zealand the emphasis should be on our desire to examine with them how best to proceed so that we could achieve our objective with least damage to their defence. The Defence and Oversea Policy Committee took the view at present that we should then have a minimum military presence in Australia, though this view was without prejudice to the possibility of a decision in June/July to withdraw wholly from the area, while still honouring our obligation to assist Australia and New Zealand in the event of their being attacked. In our consultations with Australia and New Zealand we must bear in mind
the extent to which we may find that we are constrained by events in the past eighteen months, including discussions with Australia which we have initiated about our willingness to station forces there should we leave the Singapore base. We believe that they are not looking to us for more than a maritime and air presence but we must expect to be asked about this very early in the consultations. The only way in which in these circumstances we could keep open until June/July the option of withdrawing wholly by 1975-76 would be not only to avoid repeating our
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