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CINCFE. 1589/9025/5
UK EYES ONLY
A further factor reinforcing this argument was that it was accepted, that no statement could be made at this time which implied the complete disbandment of the Gurkhas. Even if this were the decision, it could not be made known without serious risks until a very much later stage in any rundown decided on.
b. The Medium Term
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF said that it had come as a shock to find the date by which a 50% cut in the strength of British forces required was 1st April 1970. The problems which such an early date created concerned the economy and well-being of Singapore, rather than military aspects. If the date of 1st April 1970 stood, the civilian redundancy required to achieve a 50% cut would be concentrated into less than 3 years. This would create a serious problem for Singapore in which inevitably we should be involved. He urged strongly that it should be postponed until at least 1st April 1971. The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF felt that an early public announcement of a 50% cut in our strength here would be of value, for only when this had been made could all the detailed planning involved begin. Only then could the 'need to know' be extended and Australian and New Zealand officers, at present serving on our staffs and excluded from current planning, be brought in. When the announcement was made the pattern of deployment for the remaining forces here could be decided. Any necessary visits by planners from the Ministry of Defence could then be made.
The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF said that he welcomed the Secretary of State's statement in Kuala Lumpur regarding the continuing validity of the Anglo/ Malaysian Defence Agreement. It was now necessary to review our policy towards ANZAM and the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. This would be affected by our attitude to SEATO. As regards SEATO several options were open to
us:-
(1) We could make no force declarations of any kind.
(2) We could retain our membership but cease to declare any land forces, except possibly the Amphibious Force. In this event Australia and New Zealand would probably regard the brigade serving in Vietnam as their contribution and plan to transfer it to Thailand to meet SEATO plans, as the Americans did, its logistic support being integrated with the Americans.
(3) We could provide one battalion to an Australian brigade, which might well be the brigade currently in South Vietnam. In this event the United Kingdom battalion would join the formation if it were deployed to Thailand. The logistic backing and administration of the battalion group might them follow the Australian pattern of integration with the United States forces.
(4) We could maintain our present force declarations but provide the forces concerned direct from the United Kingdom, making it clear that it would take four months to deploy the complete force to Thailand. This alternative would present considerable problems, particularly as far as joint training and planning with the Australian and New Zealand elements of the force were concerned.
(5) We could undertake to provide a complete brigade group direct from the United Kingdom, thus making available a British brigade to serve in an ANZUK Division. This would be simpler than (4) above but meant an increased force contribution.
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/Naval.