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2.
AMERICAN CONNECTIONS SEMICOLON AND THE RITUAL NEED TO BE BOTH
ANTI-COLONIAL AND ANTI-CAPITALIST.
(E) AS FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERNED, THE JOKER IN THE PACK IS (5)
THIS IS WHAT WE MUST GUARD OURSELVES AGAINST, AND BE IN A BETTER
POSITION TO MEET IF IT HAPPENS.
2. WHERE IN THIS MIXTURE DO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON
HONG KONG'S PART, OR A SEARCH HERE FOR MEASURES TO END CONFRONTATION,
COME IN ? SUCH MEASURES COULD NOT HELP TO MODIFY THE GENERAL STATE
OF MIND OF THE CHINESE NOR UNDO THE EVENTS OF LAST YEAR.
WE CANNOT EXPECT TO PERSUADE LOCAL COMMUNISTS TO STOP OR
SUBSTANTIALLY MUTE THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN ADHERENTS AND STRENGTHEN
THEIR INFLUENCE: CONCESSIONS WOULD ONLY HELP THEM IN THIS.
NEITHER THE MILITANTS HERE NOR THE MODERATES WILL EVER BE PERSUADED
TO BE ANYTHING BUT BASICALLY HOSTILE TOWARDS US. CONCESSIONARY
MOVES WOULD NOT BE HELPING THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP TO ENFORCE
THEIR PRESENT TACTIC OF AVOIDING MILITANCY, WHICH WOULD ONLY BE
ENCOURAGED BY PROSPECTS OF 'VICTORY'.
3. POSSIBLY A HIGHLY CONCESSIONARY ATTITUDE MIGHT STRENGTHEN THE HANDS
OF THE MODERATES IN THE CPC AND THUS AVOID THE HYPOTHETICAL
EVENTUALITY OF A CHANGE IN POLICY LEADING TO MILITANCY AGAIN
CTHE PARAGRAPH 1(B) SITUATION). BUT IT IS JUST AS
ARGUABLE THAT WE WOULD ONLY DE PROVIDING AMMUNITION FOR THE MILITANTS
WHO WOULD CLAIM THAT PRESSURE HAD BROUGHT RESULTS. IF THIS OCCURRED
WE WOULD HAVE WEAKENED OUR POSITION FOR NO GAIN, AND IRRETRIEVABLY.
UNLESS THE BENEFITS TO BE OBTAINED ARE VERY CERTAIN, THEREFORE,
I CANNOT SEE MUCH SENSE IN RISKING IT.
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