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are precluded because it is hard to persuade the public of the need to make concession. Surely if the situation is now favourable this would make it a safe time to make gestures which would come, and be seen as coming, from strength.
5. Paragraph 4 also suggests that concessions aimed at improving Sino - British relations might not be well received in Hong Kong since they would suggest subordination of Hong Kong to United Kingdom interests. I recognise that public opinion in Hong Kong must be an important factor, but with respect would not this be a case of the tail wagging the dog? I would think that the Brit ish public and Parliamentary opinion would be concerned to think that such an important issue as Sino - British relations was being subordinated to public opinion in Hong Kong. But
in fact concessions should bring benefits in Hong Kong in the form of reduced tension, whereas so long as confrontation persists there is always a greater risk of renewed trouble in the Colony. It is argued that there is little evidence to suggest that concessions already made have significantly influenced the political atmosphere in Hong Kong.
I think the simple answer is that so far we have not made concession on key issue that might produce results. In other areas, as paragraph 7 recognises, we have on occasions gained something from concessions.
F.0. pass Priority Hong Kong.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
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