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HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 1007 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3
THE SAME TIME, BUT THAT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT HE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE MORE SPECIFIC ASSURANCES ABOUT GREY.
8. IF THE REPLY FROM THE CHINESE WAS THAT THE RELEASE OF HSUEH AND LO WAS NOT ENOUGH, AND THAT WE MUST ALSO OFFER THE RELEASE OF ALL THE NEWS WORKERS, I WOULD SEE VERY GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING, AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL NOT BE CONTEMPLATED, IN THIS EVENT, I WOULD WISH CATER TO SAY THAT HE REGRETTED HE COULD NOT PURSUE THE MATTER ON THAT BASIS.
9. I REALISE THAT THERE ARE BOUND TO BE SOME HESITATIONS ABOUT USING
HE CATER CHANNEL, ESPECIALLY SINCE WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO DO ANY SERIOUS BUSINESS BY THAT MEANS, BUT IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE OFFICIALLY COMMITTED AND IT WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL TEST OF THE VALUE OF THIS CHANNEL. THE ALTERNATIVE INFORMAL CHANNEL, VIA N.C.N.A. HERE HAS THE DISADVANTAGES THAT THE N.C.N.A. IS LIKELY TO BE INTRANSIGENT ON THIS ISSUE AND IT WOULD COMMIT THE GOVERNMENT MORE CLEARLY. THE DISADVANTAGE OF AN APPROACH IN PEKING IS THAT BOTH SIDES MIGHT FIND THEMSELVES COMMITTED OFFICIALLY TO IRRECONCILABLE ATTITUDES. THIS MIGHT BE POSITIVELY DAMAGING TO GREY'S CHANCES OF RELEASE, AND I WOULD ADVISE AGAINST IT.
10. I AM THEREFORE NOW PREPARED IF NECESSARY TO CONTEMPLATE AN ACT OF CLEMENCY LIMITED TO HSUEH AND LO ON THE HYPOTHESIS IN PARAGRAPH 4(A) OF YOUR TELEGRAM, BUT I WOULD MUCH PREFER TO SEE THE
MATTER HANDLED AS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. I DO SEE DIFFICULTIES ON THE HYPOTHESIS IN PARAGRAPH 4(B): BUT SO MUCH DEPENDS ON WHAT THE CHINESE ACTUALLY SAY THAT IT WOULD SEEM BETTER TO LEAVE A FIRM ANSWER UNTIL THEIR REPLY CAN BE EVALUATED.
11.
DISCUSSED THIS TELEGRAM WITH HOPSON BEFORE DEPARTURE. HIS FIRM VIEW IS THAT THE BEST CHANCE OF GETTING GREY RELEASED IS TO RELEASE HSUEH AND LO UNCONDITIONALLY NOW. IF HOWEVER THIS WAS TO BE DECIDED AGAINST, HE WOULD REGARD THE PROPOSALS IN THIS TELEGRAM
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