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13. This argument has at first sight a certain force, though
I think that on examination it proves open to overriding
objections,
In the first place it assumes that any concessions
to the Chinese are likely to lead only to further demands and
that they will not stop short of a Macao situation. I think
this is a false assumption for the reasons given in paragraph 8
above and that, while communist intentions are by no means entirely
clear, the balance of evidence suggests that they would favour
a settlement on terms we might accept, or at the worst that there is sufficient uncertainty to justify exploration on cur
part. Nor has our experience over the last year been that
mecting Chinese terms has always led to now demands. So far
when we have come to an agreement with them the bargain has
usually been honoured (e.g. the visit to Groy). These arguments
also assume that the release of communist prisoners now would
gravely injure public morale in Hong Kong.
wonder if this is a reasonable assumption.
With respect, I
Surely it is just
as (rguable that public opinion is worried at the continu~tion
of confrontation end would welcome acts indicating a return
to normality? The border agreement of November 1967 involved
concessions to the communists but brought considerable benefits
and was broadly welcomed by Hong Kong opinion.
Special prison
visits in April this year were adroitly presented as a sign
of diminishing tension. The press reaction in Hong Kong from
both right and left to the recent release of four detainees has
been encouraging (quite apart from the possibility that it
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