CONFIDENTIAL
too much face but without compromising our essential interests?
At this point it may scen reasonable to object that any worthwhile
concession to the Chinese would be dangerous, in that it would
cncourage extremists to ask for more and undermine our
position in Hong Kong. The argument might run that, the
release of confrontation prisoners (which would probably have to
be the nub of any settlement) would be a fatal blow to public
confidence and the prestige of the Hong Kong Government and
would encourage the communists to make new and more outrageous
demands leading eventually to humiliation on the Macao pattern.
The communists, it might be argued, have shown no real roadiness
to reach a settlement. Alternatively, if they really do want
one, we have only to sit tight and wait for them to climb down.
Our only course therefore is, while avoiding provocation, to
maintain a firm front to Chinese pressure, to make no
discrimination in favour of communist prisoners and to let them
serve their term. The majority would be released in the
nornal way in 1968 and 1969 (though some 80 to 90 will remain.
in prison after that date, some until 1974). Until then
the corresponding injurios to Sino-British relations in terms of
detention of British subjects and decrease in British exports
to China will have to be reluctantly accepted as a necessary
evil. We should of course bring all possible external
pressure on the Chinese, e.g. by diplomacy, publicity and economic
measures to compel them to conform to more civilised standards.
But there should be no concessions in Hong Kong.
CONFIDENTIAL
/13.