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7
and
Chinese intentions, were trying to deport or "release to
Chine"; the continued detention of the "Demodocus";
the arrest of Mr. Barrynaine.
10. Against this background of uncertainty, the Governor
of Hong Kong has had an informal approach, through delicate
but normally reliable intermediaries, purporting to have
originated with Chou En-lai. According to this approach,
the Chinese authorities would like to discuss ways and means
of bringing the troubles in Hong Kong to an end; they were,
however, having difficulties with their own activists; the
basic for the discussions would be the previous "demands" of
the Chinese Government but the majority of these would be
insisted on in token fashion only; the most difficult problem
was likely to be the release of the political prisoners in
Hong Kong, but there was nothing that could not be solved by
negotiation. On the recommendation of the Governor of Hong
Kong (Hong Kong telegram No. 330), we have authorised him to 364 follow up this approach with due caution and using a repre-
Flag
sentative who can, if necessary, be disowned.
Hong Kong (See also Annex B)
11. We have so far held that the Governor, while not being
over-rigid, should take only such measures of relaxation as
were desirable in the context of bringing things in Hong Kong
back to normal; and that if we started to make concessions
under Chinese pressure, we should be on a very slippery slope
indeed. Sir D. Hopson has suggested that it may now be in
our interest to explore the possibility of a face-saving
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