CONFIDENTIAL
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We have also informed the Chinese of our anxiety to reduce tension in Hong Kong and to improve Sino-British relations generally. The chances of success for this policy, which offers the Chinese nothing concrete in Hong Kong, are not high but any chances there are certainly depend on our avoidance so far as we can of acts likely to raise the temperature or cast doubt in our stated intentions to improve relations. A high level of visits by United States Naval vessels will provide precisely the irritant we should at present avoid.
7. The present level of visits, while it assists the Hong Kong economy is not, I suggest, essential to it or to the Colony's security. Even in the purely Hong Kong context it is arguable that we should avoid tension further visits could produce. The present level of visits is obviously valuable in context of United States- United Kingdom relations, but again, I would suggest, not vital. Nor is it in United States interest that temperature be raised again in Hong Kong. On the other hand visits at this level do serious harm to our chances for better treatment of British subjects in China, this mission and for improving Sino-British relations generally.
8. I therefore recommend strongly that until further notice we should insist upon a lower level of United States naval visits to Hong Kong and in particular should for the time being refuse clearance to United States nuclear vessels or heavy vessels. We should keeį the situation under review and if atmosphere improves could consider returning to something like former scale of visits.
9. It may be argued that above will be giving way to Chinese pressure and therefore wrong. But if we are to hope for any rever- sion to normality in our relations we should not disregard the Chinese on all issues. We cannot apparently meet them on major questions e.g. prisoners. Let us at least avoid trouble if we can on secondary matters. We certainly do not want to allow the Chinese to dictate our policies in Hong Kong (your telegram No. 536, 73 paragraph 2(a)). But if we are to avoid further crises let alone improve our present appalling relations, we must take some account of Chinese susceptibilities.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 365, Priority Washington 125, POLAD Singapore 146.
Sir D. Hopson.
[Repeated as requested]
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